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Brian O’Donnell:
General, did you ever feel constrained in the bombing campaign not to
strike a target because you did not have a precision-guided munition?
Michael Short:
We started this fight out as a totally precision-munitions fight. A lot has
been made in the press about the fifteen thousand foot floor that I placed on
my people. You need to understand that when we started this fight, we were
only going to attack fixed targets. We were not going to attack tanks. We were
not going to attack troops in the field. We were going to attack buildings and
airfields and aircraft shelters and bridges and those sorts of things, which are
easily identifiable from fifteen thousand feet. Restrictions were placed on me
that I could not lose any aircraft and any aircrews. So I had enormous concern
for force protection. You cannot fly high enough to avoid the radar of a sur-
face-to-air missile. But you can fly high enough to avoid small arms and light
triple-A (anti-aircraft artillery) and the IR (infra-red) missile. Fifteen thou-
sand feet was that floor, so that’s where we started out.
Every bomb that was dropped for the first X number of days in Serbia and
Kosovo was a guided munition. There were a number of NATO nations that
did not carry precision-guided munitions, and they were not allowed to drop
bombs. Then as we moved into the next phase, which was attacking the Third
Army in Kosovo, we continued to use nothing but precision munitions. Then
we found that if we controlled it properly and used the correct force that we
could drop a certain number of unguided munitions—what you and I call
dumb bombs. We did indeed drop a number of dumb bombs, particularly from
B-1s and B-52s. I understand there was a discussion earlier today about
so-called carpet bombing B-52s. No carpet bombing occurred. Outside of
Kosovo, again with the exception of the B-52 and the B-1, we dropped noth-
ing that wasn’t precision guided. Everything that hit Serbia proper was
precision-guided munitions in an attempt to control collateral damage and in
attempt to control loss of civilian life.
Leslie Green:
Do you not think that it is time we took the line that we want the military
representative with perhaps their legal advisers from the members of the coali-
tion to get together and say, putting it brutally, to hell with our constitutional
political advisers—we are going to decide, not somebody sitting
three-and-a-half thousand miles away who has not the vaguest idea of what is
going on anyway?
Michael Short:
No, sir, I can never imagine giving up civilian control of the military.
Leslie Green:
It is the constitutional control that worries me, not the civilian control.
Michael Short:
No, as strongly as I feel about men and women in my profession being al-
lowed to do their jobs, and as strongly as I would advise against
micromanagement by political appointed or elected leaders, if that is the role
they choose to play, then I have to accept that role. I advise against it. I hope
that what my own country and I saw during the last eight years was an aberra-
tion driven by a particular administration that I will not see again. But you
need to understand, I hoped the same thing in 1967 when Lyndon Johnson
was on his hands and knees in the Oval Office reviewing targets with Robert
McNamara. Remember that my generation swore that would never happen
again. In the Gulf War, in fact, it did not. George Bush the elder gave us mission-
type orders. That was not the case in 1999. But I cannot imagine a military
professional saying to hell with the constitution and to hell with our elected
and appointed leaders, we’ll do this as we see fit. That is not how we do
business.
Leslie Green:
What if the constitution of one country interferes with the military opera-




I believe, sir, you’ve got to set those rules beforehand with that particular
country. In the case of the Canadians, there were targets I knew the Canadian
F-18s were not allowed to attack. Their pilots were dying to do it, but Ottawa
was not going to allow them. So it was my job to assign those targets to a na-
tion with less restrictive guidance. I could still use the Canadians in many
roles. It is my job to fold all those capabilities together and produce a coherent
war-making effort. Now I agree with you that before the fact is when we have
to agree on what the rules are. I would take the position that before the fact we
say “nation X, if you don’t wish to attack any of these targets, that’s fine, but
you cannot prohibit the rest of us from attacking those targets.” But as far as I
can tell, that conversation never took place, and once the fight started, we
lost that leverage.
Ruth Wedgwood:
You said that the center of gravity to really win the campaign was the ruling
elite in Belgrade.
Michael Short:
Milosevic and the men and women around him who depend upon him and
who he, in turn, depends upon.
Ruth Wedgwood:
We had a big debate this afternoon about whether civilian morale as such is
ever an allowable target. From an operational point of view, fill me in on what
you make of that.
Michael Short:
Let me give you my perspective, and Colonel Sorenson who was my lawyer
will leap to his feet if I get out of bounds here even though I am retired now.
You cannot target civilians—pure and simple. Now, as a professional soldier, I
will target the power grid, which I believe will significantly impact command
and control of all Serb forces throughout the entire country. We will prohibit
their ability to move on trains, and we will make it very, very difficult for them
to do their military business. Now when I sit with my planners, I am not going
to think that you are so naive that I do not say to myself and to my planners
that this will also make the Serb population unhappy with their senior leader-
ship because they allowed this to happen. But that is a spin-off—a peripheral
result—of me targeting a valid military target.
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If I had gone to my bosses with Colonel Sorenson and said I want to target
something because it will impact the Serb civilian population, from my per-
spective, that would be totally out of bounds. That would be unacceptable.
But any thinking military professional knows that there are certain target sets
that if targeted are going to have an effect on the population which in turn will
pressure the senior leadership. There were factories that we were never able to
get to for a number of different reasons that were dual-use factories. They pro-
duced Yugos from midnight until noon and tank turrets from noon to mid-
night. That is a valid military target. Now if I blow that up, two thousand
Serbs probably just lost their jobs, and they will demonstrate outside
Milosevic’s palace because they would be unhappy. I know that, but that is not
why I targeted that facility. I will stand in any court in the land and swear to
that because that is how we hit our targets. But certainly we understand the
peripheral in that.
Christopher Greenwood:
My question is this General: Britain would have been in the dock along with
the United States, so can you see any circumstances in which it would have
been responsible for a British government not to have insisted on reviewing
targets? Can you think of any circumstances in which the United States would
allow British aircraft to fly from a US air base to attack a target without the
United States checking to see whether it would be attacking a lawful target?
Michael Short:
No, I understand your position. There were strange aircraft taking off from
Germany every day and the Germans did not exercise their prerogative to ap-
prove the targets of those aircraft. The vast majority of US strike aircraft were
stationed at Aviano, Italy and Mr D’Alema, who was struggling with extraordi-
nary skills to hold together a coalition government, never approached us and
asked to review the targets of our aircraft taking off from Aviano. So while I
certainly understand the position taken by the British government, when the
rest of my allies did not take that position, then the British position stands out
to me as a problem. Okay? I was able to work around this as long as I got a noti-
fication time or as long as I was able to understand the sensitivity of what Brit-
ain thought was good, bad, or indifferent. But on more than one occasion when
the system wasn’t working, I had dozens of strike aircraft on the tanker within
ten minutes of pushing into Serbian airspace when the word came through
from Ten Downing Street that the target was not acceptable to the British.
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